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Abstract
Background: Public health policies sometimes have unexpected effects. Understanding how policies and
interventions lead to outcomes is essential if policymakers and researchers are to intervene effectively and
reduce harmful and other unintended consequences (UCs) of their actions. Yet, evaluating complex
mechanisms and outcomes is challenging, even before considering how to predict assess and understand
outcomes and UCs when interventions are scaled up. We aimed to explore with UK policymakers why some
policies have UCs, and how researchers and policymakers should respond.
Methods: We convened a one-day workshop with 14 people involved in developing, implementing or evaluating
social and public health policies, and/or evaluating possible unintended effects. This included senior evaluators,
policymakers from government and associated agencies, and researchers, covering policy domains from public health,
social policy, poverty, and international development.
Results: Policymakers suggested UCs happen for a range of reasons: poor policy design, unclear articulation of policy
mechanisms or goals, or unclear or inappropriate evidence use, including evaluation techniques. While not always
avoidable, it was felt that UCs could be partially mitigated by better use of theory and evidence, better involvement of
stakeholders in concurrent design and evaluation of policies, and appropriate evaluation systems.
Conclusions: UCs can be used to explore the mechanisms underpinning social change caused by public health
policies. Articulating these mechanisms is essential for truly evidence-informed decision-making, to enable informed
debate about policy options, and to develop evaluation techniques. Future work includes trying to develop a holistic
stakeholder-led evaluation process.
Background
To implement effective policies and interventions in fields
such as public health or social policy, decision-makers
need to consider what works, for whom, and under what
circumstances [1, 2]. Questioning how interventions attain
their stated goals is the heart of evidence-informed deci-
sion-making (EIDM), and is the main focus of methods to
evaluate interventions. Less attention has been paid to the
unintended consequences (UCs) of interventions, that is,
the ways in which interventions may have impacts –
either positive ‘spillover’ effects or negative harms – not
planned by those implementing them.
Adverse effects have always been a part of clinical
research. Understanding the side effects of drugs and pro-
cedures is as important as their clinical effectiveness,
when deciding whether to use them in treatment. Clinical
researchers are required to report and monitor adverse
effects, interventions go through multiple rounds of test-
ing to explore possible effects, and the modes of action of
clinical interventions are usually well-articulated. In public
health, however, it is harder to connect changes in social
outcomes to specific interventions, and even harder to
articulate mechanisms underpinning these changes [3].
For example, policy interventions which change the built
environment will affect people differently according to
where they live, their use of the public space, their age and
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sex, amongst other factors. Even aside from this, complex
social or policy interventions may have unexpected
impacts at a population level, for reasons which are hard
to predict in advance. Finally, social and policy interven-
tions are not regulated and monitored in the same way,
meaning UCs could be harder to identify.
Reducing harm, and gaining a more complete under-
standing of why policies and interventions have the effects
they do, can help policymakers to intervene more success-
fully in social systems, as well as informing researchers
about the mechanisms underlying social change [4]. Yet,
our current understanding of how policies are made
suggests that there is limited testing of policies [5], that
the potential for evidence to be used is not always maxi-
mised [6–9], and that the underlying models and theories
of policies are not always made explicit [10–13]. These
characteristics of the policy process may lead to UCs, and
offer potential pathways to their alleviation.
Therefore, this project was designed to enable us to
learn from stakeholders’ views about the unintended
consequences of policies, to seek their advice about
important research topics in this area and key examples
to explore, and to identify potential avenues for future
enquiry.
Aims
Building on our previous work examining adverse effects
of public health policies [3], this project aimed to gather
stakeholder perspectives on how UCs of policies and
interventions arise in order to develop ideas for future
research into unintended effects caused by public health
policies and interventions. This paper focuses on why
unintended consequences may arise, and how researchers
and policymakers can attempt to respond. Another paper
focusing particularly on issues of evaluation has already
been published [14].
Methods
We sought to develop our understanding of how UCs
are perceived by policymakers and researchers by hold-
ing a one-day workshop with senior UK policymakers
and researchers with interests in public health, social
policy, development, poverty and evaluation (n = 14).
We used a focus group design (following Petticrew/
Whitehead [15, 16]) to allow enough time for discus-
sions to evolve naturally, enabling us to capture the
complexities of the policy and research issues associated
with unintended consequences. While they cannot
capture data with the same granularity as interviews,
focus groups are useful to bring together a range of
stakeholders, and to enable discussion between those
with different perspectives [17]. This discussion can, as
was the case with our workshop, allow participants to
build on and engage with each other’s responses. It was
important to us to achieve this as we anticipated that
collecting data about UCs would be challenging, that
people may not always be aware of or label their own
experiences as to do with unintended consequences
without prompting, and that hearing others talk may
spark new ideas and connections. This fitted with our
aims to explore a range of perspectives, rather than
generate rich, exhaustive accounts of unintended conse-
quences about particular cases.
We contacted 44 senior officials at key UK1 organisa-
tions by email, with a reminder within a fortnight (e.g.
Public Health England (PHE), Department of Health
(DH), Food Standards Agency (FSA)) and invited a
representative to attend. We identified the key public
health and policy organisations through consultation
with policy colleagues (e.g. at PHE) and through examin-
ing key organisational governance structures. We aimed
purposively to recruit a range of policy colleagues work-
ing at different levels, in different roles (e.g. evaluation,
policy development, implementation, research and strat-
egy) in different areas, to allow us to identify key issues
for research into unintended consequences and to seek
advice about how to explore these at all levels.
Of the 44, 12 originally accepted but then pulled
out, 8 declined and 8 never answered (mainly local
public health officials). Two attendees were unable to
come on the day, leaving 14 participants. They in-
cluded heads of department, senior strategies, aca-
demics, and evaluation leads at institutions such as
the Government Evaluation Unit, NatCen and the
Office for National Statistics (Table 1).
We conducted three in-depth sessions, facilitated by
authors, exploring the following questions: (1) Why do
Table 1 Participant characteristics (assessed by authors)
Area of work Employer type Experience
1 Social policy Third sector Senior
2 Drugs policy Government Senior
3 Evaluation Independent public body Mid-level
4 Public health University Senior
5 Evaluation Independent research institute Mid-level
6 Evaluation Independent public body Mid-level
7 Public health Independent public body Mid-level
8 Public health University Senior
9 Public health Government Mid-level
10 Evaluation Third sector Mid-level
11 Evaluation Private industry Mid-level
12 Health policy Government Mid-level
13 Public health Government Senior
14 Public policy Independent public body Senior
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policies and interventions have UCs, (2) how to manage
UCs, and (3) evaluating UCs. Each session included a
brief presentation from a facilitator presenting the main
evidence in the area, some examples of harmful inter-
ventions, and the key questions for discussion. These
were followed by small group discussions, feedback to
the larger group and refinement of concepts and ideas.
The facilitators introduced examples to work through
(including alcohol prohibition [18], juvenile recidivism
deterrence [19] and school vouchers [20] but partici-
pants were encouraged (in advance, and on the day) to
provide their own examples. Within each session, we fa-
cilitated discussion about the broader questions con-
cerning UCs, such as eliciting examples, and thinking
through the political, logistic and ethical ramifications.
At all times, the facilitators observed and took part in
the discussions, asking for clarifications and summarising
discussions regularly. We took notes separately about each
discussion, and collected data verbatim where possible
(following Petticrew and Whitehead [15, 16]). At the end
of the day we shared these reports amongst the facilita-
tors. To organise these, KO read each set of notes and
identified common themes (e.g. ‘challenges’, ‘examples’)
through a close reading and annotation of the text, using
word processing software. The themes arose inductively
from the reports and in discussion with the other facilita-
tors. These were shared with the other facilitators, and the
notes were re-examined by each against these themes to
ensure these were coherent. No a priori coding scheme
was used, as we wanted the findings to be led by themes
identified by participants. KO collated each set of notes
into a single document, organising the data under each
theme. Each theme was then reported, prioritising the
participants’ interpretations. Each theme was shared with
JT and TL, and discussed in depth to ensure there were
no missing themes, and that the interpretation made by
KO was correct. We did not attempt to critically interpret
these themes, or to engage in any theory-driven analysis,
Rather, we present these data as offered by participants, to
allow readers the sense of the discussions on the day, and
to reflect the stakeholders’ perspectives with as much
integrity as possible. This method was useful to elicit
thoughts and responses, which was our aim, but may not
be appropriate for other aims, such as the crafting of more
detailed theory.
At times, participants mentioned specific examples of
policies or research publications. To aid the reader, the
authors have attached relevant references describing the
policy or intervention in question.
Chatham House rules were agreed, meaning partici-
pants were free to use information received, but neither
the identity or affiliation of speakers may be revealed.
Thus all participants could feel confident of speaking
freely and honestly about potentially difficult issues such
as policy failures or mishandling. We also agreed with
participants that no comments would be attributable to
individual speakers, which is why we have not identified
the posts or roles of participants.
Participants gave their consent for verbatim and
summary notes to be used in the preparation of this and
other publications. The results below draw directly on
the thematic notes, which are verbatim reports as far as
possible. The characterisations and inferences made are
drawn by participants, not the authors.
Results
We captured views about how policymakers and re-
searchers define, describe, anticipate and plan to evalu-
ate UCs. Below, we summarise the key points under
each theme identified: the ‘nature of UCs’; the ‘causes of
UCs’ (subthemes: policy design, unclear policy goals,
policy implementation / evaluation); ‘evidence use’; and
‘Responding to UCs’.
There were significant commonalities between the par-
ticipants’ views, which are summarised below. We did not
attempt to achieve thematic or theory saturation, as this
workshop aimed to inform our thinking about the poten-
tial to investigate UCs, rather than to assert a definitive
account. The results are therefore still informative.
The nature of unintended consequences
Broadly, participants agreed politicians and intervention-
ists are motivated by the desire to improve social out-
comes, and believe that their actions will work. It was
accepted that policymakers knew that sometimes not all
policies worked for all, even harming some. Politically,
this means that discussion of UCs, let alone evaluation
of them, was challenging. Admitting to uncertainty was
difficult for policymakers who often felt they were
fighting to maintain a position.
Participants distinguished between UCs caused by
counterproductive policy (which has the opposite effect
to that intended), ineffective policy (no effect), and those
which were by-products, or out of scope (affected other
outcomes or populations than those intended). For
example, Scared Straight was counterproductive [19],
NHS reorganisation(s) was ineffective, and the smoking
ban had unexpected (positive) effects on short-term car-
diac deaths [21], where only long-term outcomes had
been envisaged. This is a similar division of harms as
proposed by Bonell et al., with counterproductive pol-
icies analogous to paradoxical effects, and the out-of-
scope to harmful externalities [4], but additionally
identifies ‘null results’ as an UC.
Participants felt some harmful UCs were acceptable,
but others required immediate attention. For example,
cycling to school schemes benefitted children’s health,
but could also lead to increased injuries and emergency
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hospital visits. Balancing the positive and negative effects
was a task for decision-makers, but it was noted that the
most disenfranchised often bear the brunt of UCs,
although their distribution is never fully predictable in
advance.
Most participants felt that UCs were very common –
with some arguing that any sufficiently complex interven-
tion will have some UCs – but that data on them were not
usually systematically collected. They also observed that
what counts as a UC is not necessarily an objective fact
but rather a matter of perspective: consequences may be
unintended or unexpected by some but not by others.
This led to a discussion about how sometimes policy-
makers were ‘outsiders’ to social situations, meaning they
were not well-placed to design interventions in that they
had little experience of implementing policies.
The causes of unintended consequences
Participants felt that there were a range of reasons and
multiple causes for UCs, not all of which were under our
control. Some cautioned against assuming that ‘better’
policy design would lead to reduced potential for negative
impacts, and that it was never really possible to know in
detail how a policy would affect all groups. For those, the
question was not ‘how to avoid’ UCs, but rather ‘what’s
the best we can do as policymakers?’ Endorsing realistic
assessment of insight into the consequences of complex
policies, participants cautioned against the ‘illusion of
control’ by trying to exhaustively identify all possible UCs.
Nevertheless, participants stressed the importance of
learning from UCs, and discussed a number of factors
which may contribute to UCs:
Policy design
Some participants felt that policies were not always
designed sufficiently well to achieve their intended goals.
Policymakers are trained to develop policy using rational-
actor models, which participants felt were not always, per-
haps never, appropriate. Policy silos meant underlying
assumptions were not challenged. It was widely acknowl-
edged that blunt policy tools have multiple effects, and
thus it is not always easy to carry out a ‘surgical strike’ to
change one outcome – yet silos tended to reinforce this
linear way of thinking about outcomes, populations and
contexts which are in reality complex.
Some felt that increased testing of policies would help
to alleviate this problem. Unlike clinical trials [22], social
policies do not undergo several rounds of testing and
refinement. How seriously one needs to take UCs partly
depends on their place in the policy ‘life-cycle’, but exist-
ing mechanisms of evaluation and feedback may not
clearly distinguish ‘teething problems’ from more lasting
UCs. This means that it is less clear what the effects will
be, on whom, and by what mechanisms they will come
about. Different population subgroups will respond in
different ways – so population-wide theories of change
may not give accurate predictions of impact.
Conversely, others felt that policymakers were good at,
and received training in, policy design but not in imple-
mentation or evaluation, where UCs were also found.
Unclear policy goals
Relatedly UCs sometimes came about because of the
way policy goals were articulated, in that these were not
always well defined, so a policy may succeed on its own
terms but still have UCs.
Identifying the goal or goals of a policy may not be a
straightforward matter. Participants discussed how the
goals of policies are often intentionally ambiguous, and
depend on the context and on the audience being ad-
dressed. (This also has implications for our understand-
ing of evaluation – as one participant put it, evaluation
is necessarily valuation.) Also, policy actors may have to
emphasise a narrow subset of their aims for reasons of
acceptability or political strategy. For example, the
smoking ban in the UK was initially framed as a ques-
tion of employees’ rights to avoid harms from passive
smoking, rather than as an intervention to reduce smok-
ing rates and the associated harms to people who
smoke.
Policy implementation and evaluation
It was recognised that a policy is not a discrete event.
Some participants questioned the habit of referring to pol-
icies or interventions as well-defined entities, suggesting
that the policy process is in reality more complex and
messy than this. Much depends on details of implementa-
tion, so talking about the UCs ‘of ’ a policy elides what
happens between the strategic policy idea and the policy
as implemented or ‘enacted’ in real-world contexts.
Local and appropriate governance systems were not
always considered in the roll-out of policies, leading to
UCs. For instance, child benefit in the UK was always
given to women, until the consolidation of benefits
under Universal Credit [23–25]. This change has led to
economic power being transferred to men, disempower-
ing women and children [26].
Similarly, interventions that work well at a local level
may be rolled out at a broader scale without appropriate
testing and implementation [27]. National policies like
People’s Health Trust [28] or NHS new service models
[29] demand integration of care, but provide no defin-
ition of integration [27]). This can lead to a mismatch
between systems: e.g. health and social care that are
assumed to be working in tandem, but where in fact cuts
to health lead to greater strain on social care.
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In addition, policies achieve political momentum, so
that once a policy has been put in place, especially if it is
costly or high-profile, it can be very hard to change,
leading to negative effects. Participants suggested that in
practice evidence of UCs is held to a higher standard of
proof than evidence of positive impacts. Some partici-
pants also pointed to the long timescales involved in
evaluation, such that by the time evidence is reported
policy thinking has moved on and the evidence is no
longer relevant – which is of course relevant beyond the
analysis of UCs.
Evidence use
Cutting across these themes was a discussion about
evidence use: in developing policies, regarding the in-
volvement of stakeholders, and in evaluating polices.
Some participants felt that UCs indicated that a policy
problem had not been well posed in the first place, or
not based on an evidence-informed theory. Policy-
makers needed to consider the intervention logic, and
how it might interact with the implementation context.
As a possible symptom of this, policies often did not
reflect expected variations in behaviour of service users
or the broader public. As outsiders to the implementa-
tion context, policymakers often did not draw on user
views which could provide information relevant to how
and when the policy will play out. Participants discussed
involving experts and other stakeholders in the policy
process. There was a feeling that being more thought-
ful about how to select salient experts, and how to
consult, value and include multiple voices would help
to avoid UCs.
Evidence used was mostly discussed with reference to
evaluation methods. UCs were often connected with the
selection of outcomes for the evaluation. As discussed
above, the question of policy goals always has a political
dimension, so the choice of appropriate outcome mea-
sures may be a politically motivated process. For example,
the Scared Straight evaluation preferred by proponents of
the policy shows raised awareness of prison immediately
following the visit [19, 30, 31], which they argue demon-
strated effectiveness. It thus becomes possible to tell dif-
ferent narratives form the same policy. Sure Start is talked
about both as a success [32, 33] and a failure [34, 35],
according to whether one measured social exclusion / par-
ticipation, or educational attainment.
Responding to unintended consequences
Participants were split over whether it was possible to
predict or identify UCs. Some felt that this was an
unachievable goal in most cases, while others pointed to
concrete ways in which uncertainty could be addressed:
involving consumers, service users and other stake-
holders; testing and piloting interventions; designing
‘nested’ interventions which contain components to
mitigate anticipated UCS; and conducting formative re-
search to better understand the context. Understanding
the drivers of policies could also help observers to
understand the mechanisms by which policies are likely
to lead to effects, although only in cases where clear
policy goals are agreed and articulated.
Participants discussed how challenging it can be to
identify and present UCs, particularly negative effects.
Politicians prefer narratives of success, and are under
pressure not to admit to ‘U-turns’. In fact, they will often
maintain publicly that a policy is being continued when
it isn’t. Admitting UCS is equivalent to admitting failure
and this can only be done with political support. Public
opinion and scrutiny of politicians can lead to positive
spin rather than reflective practice.
At times, policymakers may find it easier to respond
to evidence of UCs if they are not particularly wedded to
a policy. At other times, they may react with denial /
anger – it is hard to admit something doesn’t work,
especially if it is a core ideological belief held by the pro-
ponent. This can also apply to experts advising on pol-
icies backed by long-running research projects. In
addition, poor evaluation practices make it easy to dis-
miss reports of UCs.
There are political and technical challenges to evalu-
ation, and ethical and moral issues to consider. Yet,
avoiding UCs would improve the effectiveness of policy-
making, reduce waste, and allow more focused interven-
tions. Participants discussed a number of ways to try
and address this need:
First, policymakers could recognise that a suite of in-
terventions is usually required to achieve sustainable
change in an outcome. Accepting that trade-offs need to
be made, and communicating these is essential to a
transparent system.
Secondly, involve the appropriate stakeholders and
attempt to achieve a conversation about the overall story
of an intervention or a policy – leading to a revision of
the underlying theory. This story should list the conse-
quences, setting out the theory of chance with stake-
holders, considering the whole life-cycle of the policy.
The theory of change should be revisited throughout the
policy, although in practice it may be hard to be
completely adaptive. If the policy implementation is
phased (e.g. auto enrolment) then this allows for adapta-
tion as it progresses. Key assumptions in the theory of
change could be tested, and design and evaluation run
concurrently.
Finally, accept that while it may not always fit the
political discourse to admit it, if policymakers are
made aware of UCs, they may address them behind
the scenes, by running parallel policy development
processes, for instance.
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Discussion
Key findings
Unintended consequences are common and hard to
predict or evaluate, and can arise through all parts of the
policy process. They may come about through ineffective
(null effect), counterproductive (paradoxical effect), or
other policy mechanism (harmful externalities). They are
rarely evaluated systematically [14, 36, 37], and there
are major technical and political challenges to doing
so - but substantive, ethical and moral reasons why
we should [3, 4].
Asking policymakers and researchers to consider UCs
provides a rich resource to think about the mechanisms
by which we think policies work: in other words, to articu-
late sets of hypotheses about how social change happens.
These workshops showed policymakers and researchers
grappling with the complex reality of attempting to inter-
vene in ever-changing social systems. In line with recent
calls to consider policy a complex adaptive system [38],
we observed very sophisticated reasoning about how to
manage uncertainty [9]. This concurs with presentations
of policymakers as attempting to negotiate wicked prob-
lems and solutions [39, 40]. However, there remain
important differences in how participants discussed the
policy process, and the ways in which UCs may be created
and identified, and our understanding of policy as repre-
sented in the literature. For example, participants often
referred to heuristics such as the policy cycle, which many
commentators regard as an unhelpful device for analysing
policy [41]. There were also several discussions about the
relative strength of different forms of evidence, the need
for rational decision-making in response to research
evidence, and references to ‘upskilling’ policymakers, all of
which offer a far more normative view of the policy
process than ordinarily found in the policy studies litera-
ture (see, e.g. [12, 42–46]).
Evidence use was a major theme. ‘Evidence-informed
policy’ has too often referred to the evaluation of policies
[47, 48]; and some participants suggested that there was a
role for increased testing and piloting of policies prior to
implementation, in order to identify unintended effects.
However, without being able to discuss specific scenarios,
we were not able to explore the logistics or practicalities
of this approach, although we recognise this is a key area
for future research (see, for example [5]). We suggest
there is an equally important role in the development of
theories of change, mechanisms, or logic models (all
analogous terms). Yet, this role is underemphasised by
commentators on evidence-based policy [49, 50]. Rather, a
better understanding of the various interactions between
evidence production and use is required, with attention to
systems, processes and actors, as well as outcomes.
Many participants emphasised the ambiguity and con-
tingency of the policy process, which means that linear
narratives connecting a single intervention to a limited
set of fixed outcomes are idealisations at best. Moreover,
the identification of policies and goals is itself always
political in nature, and implicitly prioritises the interests
of certain actors or groups over others; and policy itself
was described as multiple with multiple goals. This has
long been recognised in the literature on policy studies
[51–55], but its implications for the evaluation of the ef-
fectiveness of policies, and the utilisation of the resulting
evidence, have not always been recognised. At several
times in the discussion, participants discussed artefacts
of the policy process (e.g. the use of ‘blunt policy tools’,
the ‘policy cycle’) or characteristics of the policy actors
(e.g. preferring ‘rational actor’ models) which were sur-
prising to us, as from a policy studies perspective these
represent rather normative views of the policy process
[55]. Further research would be required to interrogate
how different participants conceptualised or operationa-
lised these ideas, how widely they were shared, and the
currency they hold in the practice of policy.
Running through all the discussions was a theme about
public engagement. Listening to the right voices, at the
right time, may not be a panacea for unintended conse-
quences, but better use of public deliberation may make
policy more effective, and more predictable [42, 56]. Also,
balancing the positive and possible negative effects of
policies and interventions implies a deliberation takes
place by decision-makers. It would be interesting to know
how open and explicit that deliberation is, and whether it
is inclusive of relevant stakeholders – and indeed whether
deliberative approaches do lead to better policymaking
practices [57, 58].
As some participants noted, unintended consequences
may fall most heavily on the most disenfranchised. Thus,
thinking carefully about who is likely to be affected by
policies is a question of equity, and one which can be
addressed through mindful stakeholder engagement.
The aim of these workshops was not to provide rich, in-
depth accounts of the perspectives of policymakers, or to
generate evaluations of specific unintended consequences.
Neither is the methodology a one-size fits-all approach,
but designed here to elicit frank and open responses in
response to particular provocations. Rather, we aimed to
report perspectives of stakeholders, without relating these
to existing work on policy theory or evaluation, in order
to give a clear picture of how policymakers and re-
searchers view the complexity of the task facing those
researching and managing UCs. Therefore, we have not
attempted to critique particular statements, or to impose
our own ontological views about evidence production and
use on these findings. Rather, we hope that these results
offer a set of questions for future researchers, building on
these findings. In particular, we believe that the following
would be fruitful avenues for discussion:
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1. An exploration of the implicit models of
policymaking which are offered by these
perspectives about unintended consequences.
2. The mechanisms which are implicitly or explicitly
used to develop or evaluate policies, or which
conceptually underpin policies.
3. The role of evidence in supporting these
mechanisms, and particularly the potential for
coproducing mechanisms to inform policy
development, evaluation and implementation
4. The importance of identifying unintended
consequences for public health in particular, which
can affect entire populations
5. The role of evaluation, monitoring and reporting,
and governance of public health policies in
identifying and mitigating unintended
consequences; and
6. How best to adapt existing evaluation frameworks
to enable a better understanding of unintended
consequences in public health
We also believe there would be significant value in sys-
tematically identifying all policies in public health which
have had unintended or harmful effects, to begin the work
of understanding and avoiding this phenomenon. We
believe that public health policy interventions, particularly
those addressing social or environmental determinants of
health, need to be seen within a broader understanding of
the policy process. Hence, we aimed to access perspectives
from a range of fields, on the assumption (which we think
is borne out by the findings) that participants’ views and
experiences would have similarities across sectors.
Implications
Finally, we note that while all participants accepted the
idea that policies and interventions may have unexpected
effects, this is rarely taken into account by research or
evaluation funding. Honest policymaking requires a holis-
tic understanding of the ways in which policies play out.
This should include equal humility from researchers and
commissioners about the ways in which we do not under-
stand, or fail to predict, the impacts of our interventions
on social systems.
Limitations
This workshop was relatively limited in size, and we did not
have access to complete transcripts. We also conducted the
analysis inductively, aiming to privilege participants’ ac-
counts and reports, rather than our own interpretation.
This has meant that we have at times conducted a theoret-
ically naïve analysis, and we acknowledge that this may
have biased results. However, we intended to produce a set
of questions for future investigation rather than produce a
rich account of policymakers’ accounts – work which we
believe is important, and necessary, but we are not able to
make those kinds of claims given the data available to us.
Instead, we delineate a novel field of enquiry for public
health research.
Conclusions
Unintended consequences of policies and interventions
are occasionally, but not systematically reported. Little is
known about how they arise, if they fall into categories,
or how to evaluate and respond to them. Thinking about
unintended consequences of policies can help us to learn
about how policies and interventions play out, and the
actual mechanisms leading to social change. Our study
suggests that developing better theories about how pol-
icies will work requires input from people who will be
affected by the policy, and by those involved in develop-
ing and implementing it.
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